Freedom and Responsibility in Context by Ann Whittle

Author:Ann Whittle [Whittle, Ann]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: philosophy, Ethics & Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics, language
ISBN: 9780192845603
Google: pGtEEAAAQBAJ
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2021-10-28T00:29:41.889569+00:00

Freedom and Responsibility in Context. Ann Whittle, Oxford University Press. © Ann Whittle 2021.

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192845603.003.0006

1 This is closer to Hawthorne’s second proposal, which ties the rules of proper ignoring with actual human practice. Hawthorne is not much taken with this approach, but Willaschek (2010) suggests something similar, tying the relevant context of attributions for freedom entirely to the ‘evaluative context’, which has its own set of acceptable excuses and exemptions. I will discuss this view in more detail in §9.5.

2 Some philosophers think that psychopaths who lack moral sensibilities can be morally responsible (see, for instance, Talbert 2008). I think that this is mistaken, at least given the control theory of moral responsibility presupposed here (see the introduction). But the example could perhaps be made less controversial by exchanging psychopaths for aliens that are radically different from humans and who, whilst intelligent, are completely lacking any moral understanding. Such creatures, I think, might act with regulative freedom but not morally responsibly.

3 I am extrapolating here slightly, as Jeppsson does not focus on abilities to do otherwise, just on what is determined to happen given the past and the laws. However, I do not think I do damage to her account by talking in these terms, and the points I make against the position are not affected by this change.

4 According to Dennett’s terminology, on the intentional stance, ‘One predicts behaviour…by ascribing to the system the possession of certain information and by supposing it to be directed by certain goals, and then by working out the most reasonable or appropriate action on the basis of these ascriptions and suppositions’ (1971, p.90). In contrast, the physical stance bases predictions on the actual physical state of the system and our knowledge of the laws.

5 At the time of writing, Hawthorne’s (2001) and Rieber’s (2006) contextual analyses are the most influential and so I shall focus upon them here. In addition, there is another contextual analysis offered by Jeppsson (2016), discussed in §5.1. Willaschek (2010) also says he is offering a contextual account of freedom, but he fixes attributions of freedom to the evaluative context, and so, in the terminology as it is being employed here, he offers an invariant compatibilist analysis of freedom (see §9.5 for further discussion). Both Jeppsson and Willaschek’s analyses, however, utilize the key component of Rieber’s analysis, that free actions are original causes. As a result, my criticisms of Rieber will, to a certain extent, also carry over to their analyses.

6 It might be objected that those who think that freedom is impossible, such as Strawson (1994), do think that, because we are not in control of the way we are, and couldn’t be, we are not free. So the fact that our existence is not under our control does pose a problem. I think that this is doubtful since the fact of our existence is distinct from the way that we are, but in any case, we can switch the example. For instance, the fact that S acts

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